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Abstract In both their external and internal communi-
cations, organizations tend to present diversity manage-
ment (DM) approaches and corporate social responsibility
initiatives as a kind of morally ‘good’ organizational
practice. With regard to the treatment of employees, both
concepts largely assume equality to be an indicator (as well
as a goal) of organizational ‘goodness’, e.g. in terms of
equal treatment, or affording equal opportunities. Addi-
tionally, research on this issue predominantly refers to
prescriptive and imperative moralities that address the
initiatives themselves, and values them morally. Schopen-
hauer opposes these moralities by conceptualizing morality
as exclusively being based on the incentives of acting in-
stead of the actions themselves. He identifies egoism,
compassion, and malice as the sole incentives for every
human action, whereby only those actions solely motivated
by compassion can be ascribed genuine moral worth. In
this context, this article shows that from a Schopenhauerian
perspective, CSR and DM initiatives only have a genuine
moral worth in so far as the individuals who have initiated
or supported their implementation were exclusively moti-
vated by compassion. Stressing the narrative of a business
case, if utilized as a fac¸ade for true compassion that at-
taches economic legitimacy to these initiatives, does not
necessarily harm their moral worth. The approach and the
findings developed in this paper contribute to the discourse
on the ethical behavior of organizations, as well as to the
discourse on CSR and DM.
Keywords Business case  Compassion, egoism, and
malice  Corporate social responsibility  Diversity
management  Justice and loving kindness  Mitleid
Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and diversity man-
agement (DM) are two closely linked concepts with differ-
ent backgrounds and geneses. Since the 1950s, discourse on
CSR, and on the different layers of social responsibilities of
economic operators, has intensified in Western countries
(Carroll 1999). The 1990s saw a renewed impetus given to
academic publications on CSR, mainly due to an increase in
corporate scandals, which showed the potentially negative
consequences of ‘corporate social irresponsibility’ (Morsing
and Schultz 2006). An oft-cited example is the case of Shell
and its plans to sink the oil storage buoy Brent Spar in the
North Sea, and its operations in Nigeria (Livesey 2001).
Nowadays CSR is a widespread label that is predominantly
utilized by large, multinational companies, because, at least
in the eyes of the public, they are usually more prone to
acting in an ‘irresponsible manner’, than locally anchored
SMEs (Nielsen and Thomsen 2009). These companies use
CSR as an umbrella term for their corporate actions on
environmental and social sustainability, the latter targeting
the ‘‘labor conditions of the company itself and its suppliers,
[and] the contribution to social problems of society at large’’
(Graafland et al. 2004, p. 147). Underlying this expression is
the assumption, or assertion, that even private companies
should have a public responsibility, an assumption that
partially equates CSR with the concept of corporate ci-
tizenship (Carroll 1998). Broadly speaking, this responsi-
bility for the societies in which the company is operating is a
responsibility for maintaining or ameliorating the working
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and living conditions of the people that live in these soci-
eties, especially of those who work for the company (Gar-
riga and Mele´ 2004; Goodpaster 1983). In the last few
decades, a greater environmental awareness has come into
play in the field of CSR, and a more sustainable use of
natural resources has become imperative when implement-
ing CSR measures (Babiak and Trendafilova 2011; Moon
2007). Although CSR is difficult to define as an exact
concept with concrete organizational actions (Dahlsrud
2008), in general, it is a double counterpoint to the image of
the capitalistic industrial corporations of the 19th century
that massively exploited their workers and the environment
(Shaw 2009). Despite aiming at ‘‘taming’’ capitalism in a
certain way, the concept is usually embedded into an un-
derstanding of taking these actions without harming the
company’s profitability (Scott 2007).
Diversity management, on the other hand, is a much
newer management concept that, in contrast to CSR, clearly
emerged in the USA and nowadays diffuses into Western
capitalist countries. After the elimination of affirmative ac-
tion obligations in the USA in the 1980s, DM took its place
in terms of handling workplace discriminations (Gilbert
et al. 1999; Kelly and Dobbin 1998). Affirmative actions
were aimed at overcoming workplace discrimination and job
segregation for blacks and women. This is the reason why, at
least in the USA, gender and race are still by far those
dimensions of diversity that receive the most attention
(Herring 2009). Nevertheless, DM can include a much
broader spectrum of workforce diversity, including addi-
tional dimensions of diversity such as religion, sexual ori-
entation, age, disability status, nationality, etc. Similar to
CSR, DM is also a controversial concept with numerous
potential definitions that cover different dimensions of ref-
erence, different organizational goals, and different ways of
reaching these goals (Tatli 2011; Tatli et al. 2012). However,
DM exceeds the anti-discriminatory intention of affirmative
action programs, at least by trend, by assuming an economic
benefit from managing workforce diversities (Dass and
Parker 1999). As antidiscrimination and the inclusion of a
diverse workforce can easily be subsumed into socially re-
sponsible behavior, in practice, companies very often treat
both concepts together. In their external communication,
companies mostly publish their closely linked CSR Reports
and Diversity Reports; some companies even label diversity
as one part of their CSR approach (Coupland 2006; Grosser
and Moon 2008; Holton 2005; Idowu and Towler 2004).
Both, CSR and DM are already currently widespread ap-
proaches amongst Western companies, but their diffusion is
still increasing, especially outside the USA (Danilovic et al.
2013; Lauring 2013). This leaves open the question of the
reason for this ‘success story’. There exists a huge amount of
literature that analyzes concrete economic benefits that can
work as motives for the implementation of both (McGuire
et al. 1988; Singal 2014). Another stream of research tries to
explain the global diffusion of CSR and DM in a neo-insti-
tutional way alongside various isomorphisms (Matten and
Moon 2008). Furthermore, some research elaborates on why
companies should implement one approach or another be-
cause of moral reasons, but these arguments often remain
imperative and intuitive, as they evaluate corporate actions
themselves as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ (Gotsis and Kortezi 2013; Jones
et al. 2013). In practice, companies almost always label their
CSR and DM activities as in some way morally or ethically
‘good’ activities, and, in their internal and external commu-
nication, often try to project the estimated ‘goodness’ of these
actions onto the actors themselves, aiming at giving the
company a general label of ethical ‘goodness’. An example for
this is the following line of argumentation: Donating money
for seriously ill children is assumed to be morally ‘good’;
McDonalds donates money for seriously ill children;
McDonalds therefore conducts a morally ‘good’ action;
McDonalds what it follows, is morally ‘good’. This example
shows that attaching the label of moral ‘goodness’ is scarcely
that straightforward, as we neither know anything about
McDonalds’ motivation to donate the money, nor about other
activities of McDonalds. So it is highly questionable whether a
moral label really can be attached to either the action or the
actor. Additionally, were the moral goodness of the action
itself to be stated outright, this line of argument and the re-
sulting conclusion would be formally invalidated, unless one
were to add the dubious premise that any conductor of a
morally good action is morally good.
Against this background, this paper critically reflects this
‘goodness’ or ‘evilness’ in a way that focuses on the genesis of
corporate CSR and DM activities, instead of addressing the
outcome of this process (i.e., the concrete CSR or DM prac-
tices or initiatives). An adequate philosophical system for
theoretically framing, this undertaking can be found in the
moral philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer (1841b). Thus, in
the following pages, the core elements of his moral philosophy
will be outlined. Subsequently, it will be discussed how far
organizations or companies can be seen as legitimate moral
agents and what restrictions have to be derived for judging
them morally for their actions. After this, the motivations of
organizations for implementing DM or CSR practices are
outlined and brought together with the moral categorization of
Schopenhauer’s ethic. It will be shown that the label of
morally ‘‘good’’ corporate behavior cannot, in most cases, and
at least in the way most companies use it, withstand a
Schopenhauerian categorization of ‘moral goodness’, because
most actions derive from an egoistic motivation. Neverthe-
less, moral goodness can be identified within the process of
implementing CSR or DM initiatives on the level of individual
actors, who sometimes drive forward the process of imple-
mentation because of reasons of compassion [German:
Mitleid]. This driving forward might be achieved by
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communicating an overstated prognosis, or even knowingly
communicating a false prognosis about the positive economic
outcome of such initiatives (i.e., by lying). However, since the
motivation is the crucial indicator for morality in a
Schopenhauerian moral evaluation, genuine moral worth can
then only be ascribed to the action itself, as long as no indi-
vidual is knowingly or intentionally harmed by it (e.g., were
these actions to cause business losses or reduced profit, the
shareholders of the company in question would be harmed; in
case of these actions merely not increasing profit, no harm has
been done as a status quo has been maintained, nothing has
changed and the individuals in question have not been
harmfully impacted). Although applying business case con-
siderations as motivation would fall outside the scope of
Schopenhauerian morally worthy actions, this motivation is
sometimes merely a fac¸ade for true compassion.
In focusing on the individuals who are involved in the
processes of implementing and shaping organizational DM
and CSR initiatives, this paper enriches the discourse on
the moral ‘judgeability’ of CSR and DM with a new facet.
Tracing back these initiatives to individuals’ motivations
allows a new perspective to be gained in terms of dis-
cussing their moral worth, and it opens up a new way in
which to morally evaluate organizational practices.
Schopenhauer on the Incentives of Human Acting
Schopenhauer describes egoism, compassion, and malice as
the only incentives of every human action, whereby com-
passion is the only driving force that makes an action born of
this motivation a morally good action. Schopenhauer op-
poses the principle that ethics is the science that states how
people ought to behave. This imperative form of ethics, he
states, applies only to theological morality, a morality that
will be discussed later in this article. ‘‘By contrast, I set for
ethics the purpose of interpreting, explaining, and reducing
to their ultimate ground humans´ ways of acting, which from
a moral view are extremely varied, [… and to investigate
empirically] whether there are any actions at all to which we
must grant genuine moral worth’’ (Schopenhauer 1841b,
p. 201). In doing so, he explored, in his time, a new avenue
of categorizing behavior in a moral way, and he distanced
himself from Kant’s non-empirical morality that is based on
reason and duty (Dierksmeier 2013; Mestrovic 1989) as well
as from other prescriptive ethical theories, such as
utilitarianism (Cartwright 2008).
Egoism
Schopenhauer identifies egoism as the fundamental incen-
tive for human behavior; egoism he defines as the ‘‘urge for
existence and well-being’’ (Schopenhauer 1841b, p. 202)
that, as its ultimate object, has one’s personal well-being
and woe.
Egoism by its nature is boundless; the human wills
unconditionally to preserve his existence; wills it
unconditionally free of pains, among which are in-
cluded all want and privation; wills the greatest
possible amount of well-being, and wills every
pleasure of which he is capable, even seeks wherever
possible to develop new capacities for pleasure.
Everything which opposes the striving of his egoism
provokes his animosity, anger, hate: he will seek to
annihilate it as his enemy (Ibid., 1841b, p. 202).
As a hyperbole for people’s boundless egoism, (which he
actually later doubts to be hyperbole), Schopenhauer states:
‘‘Many a person would be capable of beating another to
death merely to grease his boots with the victim’s fat’’
(Ibid., 1841b, p. 204). As a fig leaf that covers up om-
nipresent egoism in everyday life people apply politeness,
‘‘the conventional and systematical denial of egoism in the
trifles of daily intercourse, [a certainly accepted] hypoc-
risy’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 203). ‘‘Since egoism unconditionally
pursues its ends when either it is not opposed by an ex-
ternal force, among which may be counted any fear, be it of
earthly or supernatural powers, or by the genuine moral
incentive, then, to the detriment of all, ‘the war of all
against all´ would be order of the day among the countless
mobs of egoistic individuals’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 204). Ex-
ternal forces, primarily, are state authorities (such as police
and the justice system), religious authorities, and the gen-
eral public ‘‘authority’’. The state whose sole purpose is ‘‘to
protect individuals from one another and the whole from
external enemies’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 221) penalizes viola-
tions of the laws (made by itself) in this life. Thus, behavior
that is only motivated by obeying state laws is egoistic
behavior, as its underlying incentive is the avoidance of
sanctions and related personal woe. Religions, as the most
common interpretative systems that refer to supernatural
powers, usually claim to penalize violations against their
‘‘laws’’ or to reward their observance in another life (or
hereafter). These ‘‘laws’’ mostly appear in a dogmatic way
and often try to adumbrate completely an individual’s idea
of having a conscience guiding his or her actions. ‘‘By
conscience religious people of any faith frequently under-
stand nothing other than the dogmas and precepts of their
religion and the self-examination they undertake based on
these‘‘(Ibid., 1841b, p. 199). Thus, as this kind of theolo-
gical ‘‘morality’’ is based on a system of punishment and
reward in this or (mostly) another world, human behavior
that is nothing more than obeying these rules cannot be
anything else but egoistic, because the incentive then is the
individual’s well-being in this or in another life. The third
authority gains power from the ‘‘need for a good name or
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civil honor necessary for progressing in the world’’ (Ibid.,
1841b, p. 195). Public opinion watches everyone’s steps
based ‘‘on the fundamental principle: operari sequitur esse
(‘What we do follows from what we are’)’’ (Schopenhauer
1841a, p. 122), and ‘‘never forgives a single misstep’’
(Schopenhauer 1841b, p. 195). What is wrong and right in
this context, can differ between times and societies (De-
muijnck 2014), but the observance of these rules definitely
cannot be categorized a morally ‘good’, as this is only due
to the egoistic motive of maintaining a positive image.
Compassion
As the only genuine moral incentive Schopenhauer cites
compassion [Mitleid]:
when the ultimate motivating ground for an action or
omission lies directly and exclusively in the well-
being and woe of some other person […and] intends
nothing but that this other remain unharmed or even
receive help, support, and relief. This end alone
presses the stamp of moral worth on his action or
omission (Schopenhauer 1841b, p. 212).
Thus, while egoistic actions are motivated by one’s own
well-being and woe, actions that are motivated by
compassion exclusively are motivated by another’s well-
being and woe.
This, however, necessarily presupposes that I suffer
along with his woe, feel his woe, as otherwise I would
only mine, and therefore, I immediately will his well-
being as, otherwise, I would only my own. However,
this requires that I be identified with him in some way,
i.e., that the complete distinction between me and the
other, upon precisely which my egoism rests, to a
certain degree be suspended (Ibid., 1841b, p. 212).
This demonstrates that, in order to encapsulate the meaning
of the only incentive that Schopenhauer regards as valid for
genuine morally actions, the English word ‘‘compassion’’
has to be understood more as a ‘‘suffering-with’’, as this
would be the closest translation of Mitleid [Mit = with;
Leid = suffering] (Cartwright, 1988). It becomes obvious
that his understanding of moral behavior is very closely
related to the Christian command of ‘love your neighbor as
yourself’. However, if someone were to act following this
guiding principle because it is a command (e.g., because
someone is religious), it would again be without moral
worth, because it derives not from one’s compassion for
another, but from the obeying of a principle or even a
command. Here the same applies when Schopenhauer
criticizes Kant’s categorical imperative claiming to be a
guideline for moral behavior: if one acts on the basis of a
principle or command (e.g., because one has recognized
that life is then easier, or one can prevent future personal
woe) this act can never be moral, because, at least partially,
the incentive of acting always contains elements that are
related to one’s own well-being and woe in this life (or, in
case of a religious command, also after this life) and it is
not exclusively based on compassion.
Only this compassion is the actual basis of all free
justice and all genuine loving kindness. Only insofar
as an action has originated from compassion does it
have moral worth, and anything proceeding from any
other motives has none (Ibid., 1841b, p. 213).
Malice
Besides egoism and compassion, Schopenhauer identifies a
third incentive for human action: malice.1 Where com-
passion desires another’s well-being, malice desires an-
other’s woe. Like ‘‘compassion, it is disinterested, but
which makes another’s pain its ultimate end’’ (Ibid., 1841b,
p. 213), but Schopenhauer places a value on egoistic action
that is different and distinct from that placed on malicious
actions, ‘‘since all actions stemming from [… malice] are
morally reprehensible, while [… egoism], in part, produces
morally indifferent actions’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 214). Thus,
both malice and egoism lack moral worth, but the former is
bad, and the latter is neither good nor bad. Malice implies
harming others. CSR and DM practices, on the other hand,
aim, by definition, at doing good. Malice, therefore, does
not need not to be discussed any further at this point.
The Virtue of Justice and the Virtue of Loving
Kindness
‘‘Every human action must trace back to one of these
[three] incentives although two of these can also work in
unity’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 214). For Schopenhauer, some
actions express more compassion than others, just as some
actions express more malice or egoism than others. As the
universal maxim for actions of genuine moral worth, which
thus stands as Schopenhauer’s supreme principle of ethics,
he postulates ‘‘harm no one; rather help everyone as much
as you can’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 216).
The two clauses of this maxim attach corresponding
actions which are different degrees of compassion, and
therefore of moral worth. Schopenhauer identifies two
1 Much later, and somewhat divorced from his considerations in ‘‘On
the Basis of Morality’’, Schopenhauer does, in fact, mention a fourth,
unnamed incentive for human actions ‘‘which desires one’s own woe.
Schopenhauer provided little description of this last incentive and he
claimed in a letter that it does not possess moral value [… as it] only
concerns actors themselves.’’ Cartwright (2004). Historical Dic-
tionary of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
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classes of actions based on this maxim that he classifies as
virtues: The virtue of justice and the virtue of loving
kindness.
These virtues represent ‘‘two clearly separated degrees
to which the suffering of another immediately becomes my
motive, i.e., can determine me to do or not to do some-
thing’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 216). The virtue of justice repre-
sents the lower degree of compassion, ‘‘working against
egoistic or malicious motives, it restraints me from causing
another’s suffering, from myself becoming the cause of
another’s pain, from giving rise to that which still does not
exist’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 216). The virtue of justice keeps
one from harming another for the purpose of gaining a
personal advantage, or just from following malicious mo-
tivations. In terms of just actions ‘‘it is no way required that
compassion actually be provoked in every single case, for
it often would come too late; rather, from the knowledge
achieved once and for all of the suffering which any unjust
action necessarily brings to another, which is intensified by
the feeling of the endurance of ‘unjustice’, i.e., of another’s
superior power, in noble temperaments the maxim ‘‘harm
no one’’ arises’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 218) and becomes a
principle. ‘‘For although principles and abstract cognition
generally are in no way the fountainhead or the prime basis
of morality, they are nevertheless indispensable for a moral
course of life as the container, the re´servoir, in which is
stored the disposition which has sprung from the source of
all morality’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 218).
The second virtue is the virtue of loving kindness. As a
higher degree of compassion, it goes one step further, and
‘‘differentiates itself from the first degree [i.e. justice] by
the positive character of the actions arising from it, since
compassion does not just restrain me from injuring another,
but even impels me to help him’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 229). As
compassion, in general terms, means a concern for anoth-
er’s well-being and woe, the virtue of justice represents
one’s concern about another’s woe only insofar and inso-
much as one avoids being responsible for another’s woe.
The virtue of loving kindness, in addition to this, also in-
cludes a concern about woe experienced by another that
has emerged unrelated to oneself, and it includes one’s
concern about another’s well-being. Thus, actions based on
the virtue of loving kindness, help others to reduce their
woe and enhance their well-being. In contrast, actions
which are rooted in the virtue of justice ‘‘only’’ keep one
away from being the cause of another’s woe. Nevertheless,
both virtues render actions being based in them morally
praiseworthy. However, although Schopenhauer utilizes
the term ‘‘virtue’’ his code of ethics is not one of ‘‘virtue
ethics’’ (such as the Aristotelian Nicomachean Ethics)
which seeks to prescribe how humans should act in order to
act in a morally ‘‘good’’ way. Neither are his maxims to be
understood as some sort of ‘‘duty’’ motivating human
actions. For Schopenhauer, every ‘‘ought simply has no
sense and meaning except in relation to threatened pun-
ishment or promised reward’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 139). This
would make obedience to it ‘‘self-interested, and hence,
without moral worth’’ (Ibid., 1841b, p. 139). Thus, both the
maxim and the two virtues that are inherent in it, are cri-
teria for evaluating the moral worth of human actions. This
reflects Schopenhauer’s underlying assumption that ethics
should not be framed ‘‘in a legislative-imperative form […]
as the philosopher in general must be content with an ex-
planation and interpretation of that which is given’’ (Ibid.,
1841b, pp. 136–137). For Schopenhauer, telling people
what they morally ought to do, or what they should do, is
unnecessary, since, if they are already disposed to do what
is prescribed they will do it in any case or, if they are not so
disposed, only the promise of reward or fear of punishment
will compel them to act (Cartwright 1999, pp. 257–259).
Before evaluating the organizational motives for im-
plementing these practices, it must be discussed in the next
chapter how organizations can be regarded as moral agents.
The Moral Status of Organizations
The term ‘‘Corporate Social Responsibility’’ itself seems to
imply the assumption that corporations are fully fledged
moral agents (Klonoski 1991). The idea of ‘responsibility’
and related ‘responsible behavior’ points to an imperative
morality being based on principles, commands, or other
kinds of expectations about morally ‘good’ behavior. Thus,
from a Schopenhauerian perspective ‘responsibility’ would
have to be interpreted as the responsibility to act upon the
basis of the principle ‘‘harm no one; rather help everyone
as much as you can’’. In order to attach moral worth to
actions based on this principle, from a Schopenhauerian
perspective, the observance of this principle (or of the first
part of it) would have to derive from compassion tangibly
sensed in the present, or from compassion that was tangibly
sensed in the past. Aside from principle-based acting,
moral praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of actions can
only be attached to actions if these actions spring from
compassion or, (in the case of blameworthiness), from
malice. Egoism, as a motive for acting, can be set aside
from this perspective, since action based on this motive is
morally neutral, and so is neither morally praiseworthy nor
blameworthy. Thus, in Schopenhauerian terms, corporate
moral agency can be defined as the capacity to act out of
compassion or malice.
In this context an important question remains: can or-
ganizations, as such, act intentionally in such a way that
compassion or malice can be the motives for their actions?
This would be the precondition for attaching morality to
their behavior. If organizations cannot be considered as
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moral agents, then it has to be asked whether there is
someone else who can instead. The law, in most countries,
treats organizations as legal persons, and, in doing so, it
makes, for example, CSR or DM practices attributable to
organizations. Thus, from a legal perspective, organiza-
tions are usually treated as being fully responsible, and
therefore fully blameworthy or praiseworthy for their
practices (Velasquez 2003). However, legal systems gen-
erally cannot be equalized with morality systems (Frenkel
and Lurie 2001), and ‘‘rights and autonomy under the law
are not identical with moral personhood’’ (Werhane 1985,
p. 34). Thus, the question remains (Constantinescu and
Kaptein 2014). To approach this question and to discuss the
applicability of Schopenhauer’s ethics, it is necessary to
distinguish between an ‘‘organic view’’ and an ‘‘atomic
view’’ of organizational responsibility (Wolf 1985).
The Organic and the Atomic View
of Organizational Responsibility
The Organic View from a Schopenhauerian
Perspective
One might argue that an organization is not merely the sum
of its members. There might be a certain organizational
structure or certain guiding principles, that provide at least
some evidence for regarding organizations as ‘‘full-fledged
irreducible moral agents’’ (Wolf 1985, p. 270). Wolf
(1985) calls this the ‘‘Organic View of Organizations’’, and
in a more exclusive perspective this view can also be called
the ‘‘doctrine of un-redistributable corporate moral re-
sponsibility’’ (Garrett 1989). From this standpoint, ‘‘it is at
least theoretically possible that an organization do some-
thing morally praiseworthy even though none of its mem-
bers do anything praiseworthy’’ (Wolf 1985, p. 270). To
attach moral agency to organizations, it is required that
they act intentionally (Moore 1999, p. 330); from a
Schopenhauerian perspective then, an analysis is required
as to whether this organizational intention is based on
compassion, egoism, or malice. It would have to be shown
‘‘that there is sense in saying that corporations and not just
the people who work in them have reasons for doing what
they do’’ (French 1984, p. 40).
French introduces the term ‘‘Corporation’s Internal
Decision Structure’’ and utilizes it for arguing that orga-
nizations are fully fledged moral agents: ‘‘Every corpora-
tion has an internal decision structure [that includes] (1) an
organizational or responsibility flow chart that delineates
stations and levels within the corporate power structure and
(2) corporate decision recognition rule(s) (usually embed-
ded in something called ‘‘corporation policy’’)’’ (French
1979, p. 212). For French (1979), these structures make
corporations intentional entities, because, by dint of these
structures, they can act intentionally, and therefore they
have fully fledged moral agency. However, even if one
were to accept that the ‘‘Corporation’s Internal Decision
Structures’’ make corporations ‘‘intentional systems’’
(French 1979), ‘‘it does not follow that all intentional
systems are moral agents’’ (Werhane 1985, p. 38).
Suggesting that French’s line of argumentation is very
questionable, Werhane states that the corporates ‘‘so-called
intentions and their ‘‘actions’’ [derived from these inten-
tions] are the collective result of decisions made by indi-
vidual persons. The corporate is an eliminatable subject
because without persons, corporate ‘‘actions’’ literally
could not occur’’ (Werhane 1985, p. 39).
As outlined above, principle-based acting, as ‘‘just’’, and
therefore morally praiseworthy, is possible in Schopen-
hauer’s ethics. Thus, a moral perspective on organizations
themselves could derive from the possibility that an orga-
nization has ‘‘subjected itself to recognizably moral con-
straints; it could have incorporated moral considerations and
constraints into its decision-making procedure’’ (Wolf 1985,
p. 275), such as the principle ‘‘do not harm anyone’’ as part of
their ‘‘Corporation’s Internal Decision Structures’’ (French
1979). Nevertheless, the incentives for implementing these
‘‘moral’’ constraints would be the driving forces for certain
individual persons in charge of the organization, who
structured and shaped that organization; this would, there-
fore, at least question the moral worth of these organizational
principles, at least in as far as the moral praiseworthiness
would be attached to the organization itself.
If—in more concrete terms—‘moral’ arguments are
applied within organizations in such a way that an orga-
nization ‘should care for its workers and it should treat
them equally’, or ‘should protect the natural environment’,
these prescriptive commands could be interpreted as a
‘‘re´servoir, in which is stored the disposition which has
sprung from the source of all morality’’ (Schopenhauer
1841b, p. 218). In this case, organizational initiatives that
follow these principles could be interpreted as just, and
thus they could have moral worth. The designation of the
principles of, for example, treating every employee
equally, would then derive from compassion and from the
motivation to act justly. The implementation of a guiding
and binding principle would be an attempt to ensure that
organizational members act justly, and to prevent them
from letting egoistic or malicious motive lead them into
counteracting the intended directions of the principles. The
moral worth of acting beyond these principles can then
only be ascribed to the person who has established these
principles, and not to the organization itself.
A scenario is imaginable in which DM or CSR initia-
tives were developed by a compassionate individual, be-
came institutionalized as policies, and are subsequently
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applied or executed by persons who do not have such
compassion themselves. These persons might be guided by
the fear of punishment that might be inherent in a violation
of these policies, or exhibiting opposition to them. Nev-
ertheless, these actions themselves are rooted (in the past)
in compassion, although moral worth is not attached
through them to those who execute them (in the present).
However, in this case it is not the organization itself, as an
organizational actor, who can be seen as responsible for the
implementation of the principles, as the implementation
can be traced back to certain persons in charge who
established these guidelines out of compassion, or out of
the motivation to act justly.
Several studies try to identify standards or ideals for
morally praiseworthy behavior of organizations. Examples
for such ideals are DeGeorge’s (1993) concept of having
a’’moral minimum’’ governing how and what companies
should act and do, and, further to this, defining behavioral
standards that exceed this minimum which can characterize
‘‘companies of integrity’’, i.e., companies who act in a
morally praiseworthy fashion (DeGeorge 1993). Examples
would also include any kind of definition of unethical be-
havior (Kaptein 2008a, b), any kind of ‘‘golden rule’’ of
ethical behavior and moral reasoning (Velasquez 2002), any
kind of virtue ethics (Solomon 1992), and any kind of
‘‘guiding’’ prescriptive responsibility that derives from
ascribing to corporations the status of being corporate ci-
tizens (Crane and Matten 2010), or from an understanding of
‘‘social contracts’’ that bind economic systems and corpora-
tions into communities (Donaldson and Dunfee 1999).
However, any kind of moral ideal for the organizational
actions which exceeds the principle ‘‘Harm no one; rather
help as much as you can’’ would not apply under
Schopenhauerian ethics. Even then, the moral praiseworthi-
ness of these actions would more properly be attached to the
individuals within these organizations who have imple-
mented these standards or policies.
Furthermore, it is highly questionable that every orga-
nization has, as French (1979, p. 212) would have it, a clear
responsibility flow chart and a binding and comprehensive
corporation policy. Moreover, in a case of an organization
genuinely having both, it is doubtful that organizational
decisions (i.e., decisions of persons in charge within the
organizations) always follow the predefined decision track,
and that they always comply with the policies. This ques-
tion is mainly discussed in a context of legal morality,
questioning whether organizations as such, or only orga-
nizational members can be prosecuted and punished for
‘‘organizational’’ actions by state justice. As already out-
lined above, Schopenhauer describes the sole purpose of
states and their laws as ‘‘to protect individuals from one
another and the whole from external enemies’’ (Schopen-
hauer 1841b, p. 221). This is not a question of morality, but
only a question of legally taming people’s egoisms (Jordan
2009).
Nevertheless, one stream of research on corporate moral
agency builds on French’s (1979) postulation that organiza-
tions have internal decision structures, organizational guide-
lines and rules making them, as a cohesive unit, act like
humans. Based on this assumption, Goodpaster and Matthews
(1982) attach moral agency to corporations, claiming that
organizations can have a corporate conscience. They argue
that one can project the idea of humans having a ‘‘conscience’’
onto organizations as well. This ‘‘corporate conscience’’ can
provide some kind of moral guidance to the organization for
acting in a morally ‘‘good’’ way, and, just as with humans, it
can make organizations, as units, act responsibly. By
stipulating ‘‘responsible’’ behavior as an outcome of consci-
entious acting, they think that the moral responsibility of in-
dividuals is also projectable onto corporations, giving them a
guiding conscience (Goodpaster and Matthews 1982, p. 135).
One could translate this approach into the Schopenhauerian
perspective on moral agency and regard this conscience as a
moral instance that provides organizations with the capacity to
feel compassion. As a further consequence, this conscience
could then lead to praiseworthy organizational actions, or it
could prevent organizations from acting in a blameworthy
manner. However, besides the dubiousness nature of this
somewhat fragile line of argumentation, partially equalizing
acting humans with organizations, the whole concept of
‘‘conscience’’ (and thus also of a ‘‘corporate conscience’’),
would be highly questionable from a Schopenhauerian per-
spective. Although, he assumes ‘‘that actions of moral worth
leave with us […] a certain contentment that is called the
approval of conscience’’ (Schopenhauer 1841b, p. 209), this
effect of morally ‘‘good’’ actions does not enable the con-
science guiding these actions; quite the contrary: Many a one
‘‘would be amazed if he were to realize of what his conscience,
which seems to him to be so imposing, is actually composed:
approximately 1/5 fear of humans, 1/5 fear of the gods, 1/5
prejudice, 1/5 vanity, and 1/5 habit’’ (Schopenhauer 1841b,
p. 199). Thus, as the concept of having a conscience is, for
Schopenhauer, a completely irrelevant category for moral
action, it follows that the idea of a ‘‘corporate conscience’’ as a
basis for morally worthy actions becomes null and void.
Another argument, however, for doubting the possibility
that organizations could act in a morally ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’
fashion from a Schopenhauerian perspective on morality is
that ‘‘organizations do not have any emotional capacities.
They lack the unified consciousnesses necessary for feel-
ing’’ (Wolf 1985, p. 279). Thus, organizations can hardly
feel compassion (Simpson et al. 2014; Solomon 1998) or
malice, and therefore they are incapable of developing a
motivation that makes them act in a morally ‘‘good’’ or
‘‘bad’’ way, that would render them blameworthy or
praiseworthy in terms of their actions. Furthermore, it is
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questionable whether an organization can act on the basis
of egoism. In capitalistic societies ‘egoism’ might be seen
as an accepted given for profit-driven organizations as part
of the Darwinian everyday battle on the global market
(Lynch 2009) called ‘competition’. In this context, it would
be worth discussing, whether, in capitalistic societies, pri-
vate companies are something akin to the incorporation of
egoism into a non-personal body or entity (Mander 1992),
and thus, their behavior or acting is a priori and has no
moral worth. In this case, egoism cannot to be seen as an
emotional organizational state; instead it can be interpreted
as part of the ‘‘corporate DNA’’ (Mander 1992, p. 58) that
constitutes the motivational basis for organizational acting.
Nevertheless, even in these cases it is the individuals who
act within the organizations.
The Atomic View from a Schopenhauerian
Perspective
It has been shown that there is relatively little incident for
assuming that organizations, as units, have moral agency.
However, individuals definitely do so. Thus, the individuals
acting within organizations have moral agency. This leads to
the ‘‘Atomic View of Organizational Responsibility’’. The
Atomic View argues that ‘‘organizations are, after all, com-
posed of individuals’’ (Wolf 1985, p. 268) and ‘‘whenever an
organization is responsible for an action, one can always trace
back the responsibility to some of the persons within it’’ (Wolf
1985, p. 269). This argument is fundamentally in line with the
aforementioned position of Werhane (1985, p. 39), although
she claims ‘‘that corporations are collective secondary moral
agents’’ (Werhane 1989, p. 821). She derives this agency from
the necessity of having someone who is morally responsible,
in the case of organizational policies or practices which are
not, or are no longer, traceable to distinct individuals. ‘‘But
this is not to excuse individuals since they are the [creator and]
perpetuators of corporate activity in the first place’’ (Werhane
1989, p. 822). From a Schopenhauerian perspective, an action
or policy that cannot be traced back to an individual simply
cannot have any moral worth—there is no necessity per se to
attach a moral worth to every action. In fact, almost the reverse
applies: a moral worth can only be attached to actions that can
be traced back.
In the case of implementing DM or CSR activities, it is
therefore necessary to trace the process back to the incentives
of the individuals that were responsible for the implementa-
tion within the organizations to find evidence for any kind of
morality in these actions. This morality can then only be at-
tached to these concrete persons, not to an organization. Since
for Schopenhauer the omission of an action is an action as
well, that is also rooted in one’s egoism, compassion or mal-
ice, it follows that the motives of the people within the orga-
nization that deliberately did not oppose the implementation,
although they had the power to do so, can be morally ‘‘good’’
or otherwise. Thus, besides the organizational members ‘‘in
the first row’’ that pushed forward the implementation of DM
or CSR initiatives, there might be a broad ‘‘second row’’ of
persons that deliberately did (or did not) put obstacles in the
way of the implementation process, or that even took some
obstacles away, unknown to others. These persons also have
motives for their actions. Thus, their actions too can be
morally evaluated from a Schopenhauerian perspective.
However, in an Atomic View of organizations the moral value
of the organizational actions can only be derived from indi-
vidual’s motives.
To summarize, from a Schopenhauerian perspective,
corporate moral agency would inevitably have to be tied to
a corporation’s capacity to act out of compassion or malice.
However, organizations do not meet the precondition of
developing these incentives for acting because they are not
capable of feeling in general. Thus, they are neither ca-
pable of suffering or feeling ‘‘well’’ in and of themselves,
nor of feeling the suffering or well-being of others.
Therefore, they cannot make their own suffering and well-
being, or that of others, their motivation for acting, and
thus they lack the capacity to act out of compassion or
malice. It follows, therefore, that from a Schopenhauerian
standpoint, there is no evidence for attaching moral agency
to organizations themselves, because they are not capable
of developing incentives for their actions that are valid for
moral considerations. These incentives can be exclusively
held by individuals within organizations, making their ac-
tions morally ‘good’ or otherwise. In the next chapter,
different types of individual motivations and general ar-
gumentative considerations for implementing DM or CSR
initiatives will be outlined and discussed in the light of
Schopenhauer’s ethic.
Motivations for Implementing CSR and DM
As this article focuses on the reasons as to why organiza-
tions and companies implement CSR or DM initiatives, in
order to evaluate their moral worth, a closer look at the
main arguments that are often applied for legitimizing the
implementation of these initiatives is necessary.
Most literature examining the reasons why organizations
implement or should implement CSR or DM initiatives
tries to prove or to question a kind of business case of these
initiatives (Carroll and Shabana 2010; Weber 2008). There
is a huge amount of literature on the interrelation of CSR
initiatives and organizations’ reputations (Branco and Ro-
drigues 2006; Fombrun 2005). A positive reputation is
mostly seen as crucial for making an organization’s inter-
action with its stakeholders most profitable for the orga-
nization (McGuire et al. 1988; Morsing and Schultz 2006),
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especially for multinational companies (Chapple and Moon
2005; Hah and Freeman 2013). Lines of argumentation are,
for example, that a positive reputation attracts more, and
better, employees (Jones et al. 2014); that it contributes to
attracting new customers and to retaining established ones
(Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Ven 2008); that it eases the
way in which states order goods or services; or that it
makes suppliers provide better conditions (McWilliams
and Siegel 2001). Another strand of research shows that the
personal values of those individuals in charge within the
organizations are a crucial criterion for organizations
which are implementing CSR initiatives (Chin et al. 2013;
Cui et al. 2014; Hemingway and Maclagan 2004). There is
another (smaller) body of literature that elaborates on the
different kinds of moral reasons as to why organizations
implement or should implement CSR initiatives (Fred-
eriksen 2010).
As with CSR, there also exists a huge amount of lit-
erature on business case perspectives on DM. However, as
the main target group of organizational DM initiatives is
usually the organizations’ own diverse workforces (instead
of the general public, as is usually the case with CSR
initiatives) there are more lines of argumentation for a
business case of DM, besides ameliorating organizations’
reputations (Martı´n-Alca´zar et al. 2013). One field of re-
search analyzes how far a diverse workforce itself is al-
ready a benefit for the organization, e.g., because it is
making it more creative and innovative, more under-
standing and attractive for diverse customers, or less vul-
nerable to external changes (Robinson and Dechant 1997).
This stream of research economically legitimizes the im-
plementation of DM initiatives, aiming at creating a di-
verse workforce. Another field of research assumes a
diverse composition of the workforce as a given, and fo-
cuses on the best way of managing this diversity, and how
to receive the optimal outcome of it in terms of the orga-
nization’s performance (Cox and Blake 1991). As DM is
closely related to the idea of equality and equal opportu-
nities [partially also to the idea of equality of outcome
(Phillips 2004)], there is also a body of literature on
evaluating and conceptualizing DM on the basis of im-
perative morality that assumes equality to be morally
‘good’ (Anderson 1999).
Nevertheless, there is still an intense call for more
studies on the business case of CSR and DM. There seems
to be a special desire for studies that give organizations
concrete numbers in a way that predicts how many Euros
one gets back for each Euro one ‘invests’ in CSR or DM
initiatives (Heitner et al. 2013; Valor 2005). This might be
due to the still predominant assumption within the private
sector that the main goal of any corporate action is to
maximize the shareholder value; from this perspective,
every organizational initiative is constrained by the fact
that it must pay off, in order to lend it legitimacy; in these
terms reaching equality would then have no self-worth,
since revenue would cease to be generated (Barnea and
Rubin 2010). In line with the argument that CSR and DM
initiatives ameliorate organizational reputation, other
stakeholders’ interests can also be subsumed under this line
of maximizing profit and company value (e.g. Roberson
and Park 2007).
It now remains to be discussed who, from a Schopen-
hauerian perspective, would have an incentive (and, in-
deed, what manner of incentive), to implement CSR or DM
initiatives, and what would then follow from this decision
in terms of their moral praiseworthiness or blameworthi-
ness. As outlined in the chapter above, it is indicative that
moral agency could only be attached to individuals acting
within organizations, and not to organizations themselves.
From a Schopenhauerian perspective, organizations,
although they might be capable of acting intentionally (and
this is a highly controversial issue in literature (see e.g.,
Velasquez 2003), are not capable of behaving in a morally
good or bad way. Thus, in the following chapter the mor-
ality of individual behavior within organizations will be
discussed from a Schopenhauerian perspective.
The Morality of Individual Behavior Within
Organizations in Terms of CSR and DM
Having discussed the potential morality of organization
themselves, in the process of implementing CSR or DM
initiatives, the individuals that work within these organi-
zations should be looked at more closely. Individuals are
definitely moral agents, and thus they have the potential to
act in a morally ‘good’ way. The question in the context of
organizational CSR and DM initiatives is what the motives
of individuals are in initiating, supporting, or, at least, not
opposing the implementation of these initiatives.
Contextual Factors and ‘‘Ethical’’ Decision Making
Before discussing the significance of compassion as a po-
tential motive, the role of contextual pressure—and orga-
nizational context in general—has to be considered as an
active element in the process of individual decision mak-
ing. Trevin˜o et al. (2006) indentify different organizational
factors that influence every process and outcome of, as they
term it, an ‘‘individual’s ethical decision-making’’, such as
a given organization’s ethical (sub-)climates and culture,
ethical leadership, linguistic practices applied within or-
ganizations, and organizational systems of reward and
punishment (Trevin˜o et al. 2006). Moreover, the ‘‘ethical’’
behavior of individuals can be influenced by potentially
conflicting expectations and the demands of different
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stakeholders and also colleagues (Davis and Frederick
1984; Kaptein and Wempe 2002; Trevin˜o and Weaver
2003). It is true that contextual factors might influence
individual’s decision making. However, within a
Schopenhauerian framework, this does not make any dif-
ference, since these contextual factors do not hinder the
individual in terms of allowing either compassion or malice
to be the guiding incentives for acting.
From a Schopenhauerian perspective, every decision that
might affect the well-being of another person or people can
become a ‘‘moral’’ decision. This is the case when this other
person’s well-being is the criterion or the motive for the
decision. There are very few conceivable decisions that
could in no way be related to the well-being of others, re-
gardless of whether one were to wish to affect it in a negative
or positive way. Even, say, the decision of whether to have
coffee or tea for breakfast, could, at least in theoretical terms,
become a moral decision, if being made out of considerations
that are related to the well-being of coffee or tea farmers, or
the livelihood of those persons selling the coffee or tea.
Decisions that would seldom become moral decisions would
include, for example, technical decisions, e.g., about posi-
tioning and connecting different machines in a production
line. Thus, most decisions that lead to an action can be mo-
tivated by compassion or not, and so most decisions can bear
moral worth or not. Thus, from a Schopenhauerian per-
spective, considering ‘‘moral decision’’ as a type of decision
that is distinct from other kinds of decision is more or less
only a distinction in terms of the underlying motivations for
those decisions. A distinction between moral and non-moral
decisions using their ‘‘field’’, subject, or topic can hardly be
done. Thus, the category of ‘‘ethical decisions’’ or ‘‘ethical
decision making’’ is not an adequate framing for a
Schopenhauerian approach.
Individuals’ Estimations Toward Business Case
Considerations
What makes a difference in evaluating individuals’ motives
in terms of their moral value is whether one believes the
aforementioned assumption about CSR or DM strength-
ening organizational competitiveness and ameliorating or-
ganizations’ reputations. In the case where one does indeed
believe this, support of these initiatives might be due to an
individual’s career aspirations. The individual might, in
this case, aim at strengthening the organization, in order to
thereby achieve a personal success that might help him or
her for future promotions. Against this background, one
might also push forward these initiatives in order to secure
one’s own job in a more competitive organization. As the
‘‘necessity of a good name’’ exists for the individual as
well as for the organization the motive for supporting or
initiating these initiatives may also derive from societal or
legal pressure. This pressure can affect the individual be-
cause of his or her position within the organization (e.g.,
being a ‘good’ human resource manager or boss), regard-
less of whether one believes the business case argumen-
tation. All of these incentives for supporting CSR or DM
initiatives contain elements of individuals’ own well-being
and woe, and thus, are, at least partially egoistic and
therefore without genuine moral worth.
It might often be that actions are motivated by more than
one intention, e.g., by egoism and by compassion, or by
malice and by compassion, but from a Schopenhauerian
perspective these actions then have no moral worth. He
clearly states ‘‘that only another’s distress and no other
consideration must be my motive if my action is to have
moral worth’’ (Schopenhauer 1841b, p. 230).
There are two conceivable cases in which individuals
initiate or support the implementation of CSR or DM ini-
tiatives motivated by compassion, but from a Schopen-
hauerian perspective only one of these can clearly be
ascribed genuine moral worth.
Organizational Citizenship Behavior
Schopenhauer argues that in order to feel real compassion
for another, one has to identify oneself with this other, and
to feel his or her suffering as one’s own, not within oneself,
but in the other person (Cartwright 2012). Identifying in
this context means that ‘‘the barrier between I and Not-I
has been suspended: only then will there be the opportunity
immediately to take on as my own another’s need, his
distress, his suffering’’ (Schopenhauer 1841b, p. 231).
There is one concept in business and management studies
that closely correspond to this approach to compassion:
organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Organ (1988)
describes this phenomenon as the ‘‘good soldier syn-
drome’’, which describes the different propensities of em-
ployees to voluntarily assist or help colleagues, and to
promote the competitiveness and economic well-being of
their employing organization without expecting any kind of
direct or indirect reward or compensation for their conduct.
[It should be noted in this light that the concept of OCB
should not be confused with corporate citizenship, although
corporate citizenship might have an impact on the OCB of
employees (Lin et al. 2010)]. Employees apply OCB when
their level of identification with the organization for which
they work is that high, that their main incentive for acting
is concern about the well-being and woe of the organization
(Smith et al. 1983). The entity one senses compassion with
in this case is not another individual, but an organization.
This raises the question of whether organizations can be
equally ranged with individuals (and animals) as entities
for which one can have compassion. If so, from a
Schopenhauerian perspective, acting based on OCB would
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only lack moral worth if the organization’s well-being is
perceived by the actor as a means to promote the well-
being of the actor him or herself. However, individuals
who apply this behavior necessarily have to be a part (or a
member) of the organization to which they are applying
this behavior. Thus, the organization cannot clearly be
distinguished from oneself as ‘‘the other’’ for whom one
has compassion. It remains, at the very least, controversial,
as to whether acting in favor of organizational well-being
and woe might not at least partially be inevitably a si-
multaneous egoistic acting in favor of one’s individual
well-being and woe. Therefore, aside from further debate as
to whether an organization can be an object of compassion,
it is difficult to assign moral worth to OCB.
Genuine Compassion with Individuals or Animals
In terms of morally good CSR or DM initiatives, genuine
moral worth can more clearly be found on the level of indi-
viduals having compassion with other individuals. It is
definitely conceivable that an individual feels compassion,
for example with the factory workers in an Asian country that
produce goods for the company a given individual may be
working for. In this case, the individual feels the suffering of
these people because of the bad conditions they have to work
in, as his or her own suffering. This might motivate him or her
to initiate or support organizational CSR initiatives that aim
to ameliorate their working conditions and relieve their
suffering that is sensed as one’s own suffering. Schopen-
hauer explicitly includes animals in his moral philosophy,
arguing that having compassion with their sufferings also
can lead to the same moral worthiness of an individual’s
actions, as would be the case with compassion shown for
humans. Thus, another example could be the support of
corporate initiatives aiming to ameliorate animal welfare.
Besides these CSR initiatives, the same applies to DM.
Individuals might sense as their own suffering the suffering
of, for example, female, homosexual, foreign, or black col-
leagues because of everyday workplace discrimination or
marginalization, although the individual does not share the
same manifestations of the respective dimension of diver-
sity, or the individual does share it but does not feel the
marginalization directly directed at him or herself. It might
be more probable that an individual can identify with a suf-
fering person who is suffering for precisely the same reason
that the individual has suffered him or herself, either cur-
rently, or in the past (e.g., because that individual is also a
woman or one is also gay). Nevertheless, it is easily con-
ceivable that one could support or initiate DM initiatives
without having an incentive that is related to one’s personal
suffering, and thus is only rooted in the motive of reducing
other’s woe or enhancing their well-being. In this case, it is
not important to differentiate whether this compassion is
only a selective compassion or whether it is activated as part
of one’s virtues of aiming at justice (including principle-
based acting) or having embodied loving kindness.
Compassion and Business Case Rhetoric
As compassion is a motive of action that is not totally
compatible with organizational discourses on profitability,
one might choose to utilize a business case argumentation to
initiate the implementation process or to support it, regard-
less of whether one believes it or not. In the case of one not
believing in the positive economic consequences of these
initiatives, the exploitation of business case arguments might
be seen as a lie, but this lie still can be morally acceptable.
Schopenhauer does not classify lying as morally reprehen-
sible in general. He explicitly sees cases in which one has the
‘‘right to tell lies’’ (Schopenhauer 1841b, p. 159), for ex-
ample if the lie is ‘‘the legitimate means of defense against
unauthorized inquisitiveness, whose motive is hardly ever
benevolent’’ (Schopenhauer 1841b, p. 159).
Schopenhauer’s formula to measure the quantity of in-
justice can show that leading stakeholders to believe in
business case lines of argumentation does not necessarily
take away the moral worth of implementing CSR or DM
activities that derive from this starting point: ‘‘The amount
of injustice in my conduct is equal to that of the evil I
thereby inflict on another divided by the amount of ad-
vantage I thereby obtain’’ (Schopenhauer 1841b, p. 155).
Thus, if the incentives motivating the individual’s acting in
these cases are solely based in the well-being and woe of
those people who are the target groups of the CSR and DM
initiatives, the question remains as to who else might be
affected negatively by these actions. In the case of these
actions being economically harmful to organizations prof-
itability, a potential harm would emerge for the owners of
the organization, e.g., the shareholders, as they would get a
lower return on their investments. Particularly in the field
of DM, many activities aimed at including a diverse
workforce are mainly of symbolic nature without con-
suming huge budgets (Gilbert et al. 1999). CSR initiatives,
for example, can include a restructuring of internal supply
chains that might bring with it higher purchase prices, but
also here, just as in the field of DM, studies that doubt the
business case line of argumentation mostly show that they
might yield no positive economical consequences, but will
also yield no negative ones (Carroll and Shabana 2010;
Herring 2009). Positive economic consequences of CSR
and DM initiatives are often mediated by their positive
impact on the reputation of organizations. A good reputa-
tion could then, for example, make organizations more
attractive to customers or talented employees (Lii and Lee
2012; Roberson and Park 2007). This kind of ‘‘win–
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win situation’’ would not call the potential moral worth of
these initiatives into question. However, this positive in-
terrelation does not necessarily occur. Johnston and Malina
(2008), for example, show that there is no positive corre-
lation between the implementation of sexual orientation
DM and the firm value of an organization—but they also
do not find a negative correlation (Johnston and Malina
2008). Thus, some DM or CSR initiatives might not bring
any kind of return on investment. An organization might,
for example, support certain CSR initiatives in the region it
is operating in without overtly drawing attention to this, or
advertising it in any way. Thus, it might be that no
reputation effect emerges out of it. This gives the nu-
merator of Schopenhauer’s formula a value of zero. Thus, a
knowingly false stressing of the profitability of CSR and
DM activities does not harm the moral worth of the im-
plementation of these initiatives, so long as it only derives
from compassion, and the initiatives are ‘‘only’’ ‘‘neutral’’
and not harmful in economic terms. Thus, derived from the
level of individuals acting within organizations, it is pos-
sible to classify CSR or DM initiatives as morally good. In
order to uncover their moral ‘goodness’, the business case
rhetoric utilized by compassionate organizational actors
has to be unmasked and identified as a means to the end of
overcoming organizational resistance, regardless of whe-
ther this rhetoric is believed to be true or not.
Summary and Conclusion
It has been shown that, from a Schopenhauerian perspective,
CSR and DM initiatives have a genuine moral worth only in
so far as individuals who have initiated or supported their
implementation are exclusively motivated by compassion. In
referring to Schopenhauer’s ethics, this article has developed
a perspective on the moral evaluation of organizational ini-
tiatives that, as the sole criterion for the evaluation of their
moral value, is based on the motives for their implementa-
tion, instead of the initiatives themselves. CSR and DM
initiatives most commonly tend to be evaluated through
different kinds of prescriptive moralities (partially only im-
plicitly), that focus on the initiatives themselves in order to
attach moral value to them [in the case of applying a Kantian
perspective, their moral worth depends on whether they are
implemented out of ‘‘duty’’ (Evan and Freeman 1988; Guyer
2012)]. Diversity management is then equalized with
equality and equal opportunity considerations, whereby
equality is then assumed to be a criterion of morally ‘good’
action. CSR, against this background, stands for itself, as the
concept of ‘social’ behavior and ‘responsible’ behavior to-
ward humans (and the environment) can easily be considered
as criteria for moral ‘goodness’. In denying any kind of
prescriptive morality, a Schopenhauerian view contrasts
these widely held views on DM and CSR, and offers a new
perspective on the morality of CSR and DM. By placing a
special emphasis on individuals’ incentives in the process of
implementing these initiatives, a new stream of research can
be opened up. Hitherto, the role of individuals in CSR and
DM research is considered merely peripheral. It is mostly
taken for granted that these initiatives are, in any case,
morally ‘good’. Taking into account that the diffusion of
these seemingly ‘good’ initiatives is not solely due to orga-
nizational selflessness, a huge stream of research into the
business case of CSR and DM has emerged, analyzing the
economic impact of these initiatives (Carroll and Shabana
2010; Robinson and Dechant 1997). Presupposing that there
is a business case seems to take away the decision for im-
plementing CSR and DM from the individual level, and
transfers it to an organizational level, as ‘being bottom-line’
seems to be the modus operandi of every (profit-oriented)
organization. Persons in charge of the implementation within
the organizations, in this perspective, lose their individual
motivation, and become performing agents of an organiza-
tional profit-oriented principle. This approach ignores the
individuals’ maneuvering room in the process of imple-
mentation that might be used for individual purposes. The
Schopenhauerian perspective allows the integration of this
individual perspective into the discourse on the morality of
CSR and DM. Individuals within organizations might be
guided by genuine compassion when initiating or supporting
the implementation of these actions. These individuals might
also be aware that compassion is not an adequate argument
for convincing profit-oriented stakeholders, and this might
be a reason why these individuals stress the narrative of a
business case. In this context, it is conceivable that managers
push forward, for example, DM initiatives in their companies
from personal compassion. However, to the outside world,
they might represent the narrative of the business case of
DM, being fully aware that the implementation would
otherwise have less support from certain stakeholders. This
perspective broadens the discourse on business case per-
spectives on DM and CSR by integrating the organizational
actors and their motivation for referring to business case
considerations. In leaving open the possibility of merely
utilizing the business case line of argumentation for a pur-
pose that roots in actual fact in one’s sensed compassion, a
moral perspective is added to this discourse.
This Schopenhauerian perspective furthermore broadens
the relatively new discourse on compassion that is mainly
located in the field of positive organizational scholarship
(POS). ‘‘POS is concerned primarily with the study of
especially positive outcomes, processes, and attributes of
organizations and their members’’ (Cameron et al. 2003,
p. 5). In this context, compassion can be seen as both a
positive attribute of organizational members, and a positive
outcome of organizational processes. In the broadest sense,
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POS emphasizes its economic impact including ‘‘the happy
side effect of enhancing profits’’ (Caza and Carroll 2012,
p. 973). Thus, the discourse on organizational compassion,
seen as something ‘‘expressed by managers towards em-
ployees [… or] between employees within organizations’’
(Simpson et al. 2014, p. 7), acquires a new ethical facet in
addition to its psychological and economic side.
As, from a Schopenhauerian perspective, compassion
needs an identification by the one who feels compassion with
the one who is compassionated, this approach opens up an-
other new stream of future research. Genuine compassion, on
the one hand, can be a boundless compassion that is felt with
every human—Schopenhauer calls this the virtue of loving
kindness. As a ‘‘boundless compassion’’ (Fox 2006) this
loving kindness does not make a difference between differ-
ent humans, and CSR or DM approaches that are motivated
by this loving kindnesswould aim at being as comprehensive
as possible. Diversity management, then, would not limit
itself to only few dimensions of diversity, such as gender or
ethnicity. CSR initiatives would also try to reach as many
humans, as possible and they would only be restricted by the
organization’s monetary budget. However, this boundless-
ness of organizational DM or CSR activities is, in practice,
very rarely found in organizations, especially in profit-ori-
ented organizations. Genuine compassion, however, can also
be sensed for concrete persons with whom one identifies.
Here the question arises as to what makes people identify
with one another. Why does one identify with one person,
and eliminate the difference between oneself and him or her,
but the same person does not identify with another person?
What, then, is the basis of people feeling compassion for
certain other people? In terms of DM it might be the case that
if one has experienced discrimination and marginalization
because of a demographic one represents (e.g., because of
being a woman or being gay), it makes it easier to identify
with others who are suffering the same suffering one has
experienced before. Thus, gay individuals might tend to be
more compassionate toward gay persons, and sense their
suffering more easily as their own suffering; the same could
hold true for women, or people of a certain religion, etc.
However, if this is the case, this might lead to variously
shaped approaches to DM with different emphases, because
of different individuals being in charge of it. Until now, this
individual factor has mostly been ignored in research on DM
and CSR, and so individual compassion could be a starting
point for a new direction of research in this area. Future
research can examine more closely the conditions and rea-
sons as to why one individual identifies with another and
what the consequences of this could be for the shape of
corporate CSR and DM initiatives, or any other area of or-
ganizational action that might be judged on its potentially
‘moral’ content.
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